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q 201Teaching is present in all human societies, while within other species it is very limited. Something happened during the
evolution of Homo sapiens that also made us Homo docens—the teaching animal. Based on discussions of animal and
hominin learning, we analyze the evolution of intentional teaching by a series of levels that require increasing capacities of
mind reading and communication on the part of the teacher and the learner. The levels of teaching are (1) intentional
evaluative feedback, (2) drawing attention, (3) demonstrating, (4) communicating concepts, and (5) explaining relations
between concepts.We suggest that level after level has been added during the evolution of teaching.We demonstrate how
different technologies depend on increasing sophistication in the levels of cognition and communication required for
teaching them. As regards the archaeological evidence for the different levels, we argue that stable transmission of the
Oldowan technology requires at least teaching by demonstration and that learning the late Acheulean hand-axe tech-
nology requires at least communicating concepts. We conclude that H. docens preceded H. sapiens.Introduction
Teaching is present in all human societies (Csibra and Gergely
2009, 2011; Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002; Tomasello, Kruger, and
Ratner 1993). Even young children have a natural capability to
teach (Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002). On the other hand, teaching
within other species is very limited (Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thorn-
ton and Raihani 2008). So something has happened during the
evolution ofHomo sapiens that also made usHomo docens—the
teaching animal.
There is a wide divergence between disciplines concerning
what is meant by teaching. At one extreme are studies of
animals, where teaching is given a behaviorist deﬁnition (e.g.,
Caro and Hauser 1992) and no intention is required on the
part of the “teacher.” At the other extreme are ethnographic
studies, where teaching is often deﬁned as explicit verbal in-
struction. An intermediate third type comprises more cogni-
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concepts of teaching in the next section.
Instead of aiming for a unique deﬁnition of teaching, we
present a series of levels of teaching that require increasing ca-
pacities of mind reading and communication on the part of the
teacher and the learner. First of all, we separate nonintentional
teaching from intentional. Regarding nonintentional teaching,
we discuss, in “Learning without Intentional Teaching,” en-
hancement and evaluative feedback and analyze examples from
nonhuman species. Our main focus, however, is on intentional
teaching. In “Levels of Intentional Teaching,” we distinguish
between the following levels: (1) intentional evaluative feedback,
(2) drawing attention, (3) demonstrating, (4) communicating con-
cepts, and (5) explaining relationships between concepts. Since
all levels of teaching occur among modern humans, whereas
only the basic levels have been found in other species, we hy-
pothesize that level after level has been added during the evo-
lution of teaching.
Our classiﬁcation partly overlaps that of Kline (2015). She
distinguishes between teaching by social tolerance, teaching by
opportunity provisioning, teaching by stimulus or local en-
hancement, teaching by evaluative feedback, and direct active
teaching. Some of the teaching types considered by Kline map
quite clearly onto our variations of learning, nonintentional
teaching, and the ﬁrst levels of intentional teaching. For ex-
ample, teaching by social tolerance corresponds to what we sort
under imitation and emulation, together with the assumption
that the “teacher” does not prevent the imitator from observing.
However, Kline’s category “direct active teaching” is, in our
opinion, too broadly deﬁned (Gärdenfors and Högberg 2015).
In particular, it should be divided into subcategories that
separate forms of teaching that require displaced communi-served. 0011-3204/2017/5802-0003$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/691178
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“Levels of Intentional Teaching,” that teaching by demon-
stration can be accomplished without such communication,
whereas teaching concepts and explaining causal relationships
cannot. In general, we put more emphasis on the intentionality
of teaching than Kline does.
Kline does not apply her classiﬁcation to archaeology, but
this domain is our concern in “Archaeological Applications:
Teaching Oldowan and Late Acheulean Technologies.” A cen-
tral empirical question is what archaeological evidence one can
ﬁnd for when the different levels of teaching emerge in the
hominin line. With stone tool production known from 3.3 mil-
lion years ago (Mya; Harmand et al. 2015), knapped stone im-
plements and the waste material from their production provide
excellent source material for the study of the evolution of
teaching (Haidle 2010). Our main theses in “Archaeological
Applications: Teaching Oldowan and Late Acheulean Tech-
nologies” are that, for stable cultural transmission, (1) learning
Oldowan technology requires at least teaching bydemonstration
and (2) learning lateAcheulean hand-axe technology requires at
least communicating concepts. It follows from these theses that
several levels of intentional teaching predate H. sapiens. In the
concluding section, we also discuss the implications of our
analysis for the evolution of language.
Concepts of Teaching and Their Cognitive
and Communicative Requirements
Three Kinds of Deﬁnitions
There exist many proposals to delineate the meaning of teach-
ing (e.g., Caro and Hauser 1992; Leadbeater, Raine, and Chittka
2006; Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002; Thornton and Raihani 2008).
In a unifying analysis, Kline (2015) presents an account of three
major forms that she calls functional, mentalistic, and culture
based. The following deﬁnition is a well-known example of the
functional type:
An individual actor A can be said to teach if it modiﬁes its
behavior only in the presence of a naïve observer, B, at some
cost or at least without obtaining an immediate beneﬁt for
itself. A’s behavior thereby encourages or punishes B’s be-
havior, or providesBwith experience, or sets an example forB.
As a result,B acquires knowledge, or learns a skill earlier in life
or more rapidly or efﬁciently than it might otherwise do so, or
would not learn at all (Caro and Hauser 1992:153).
The deﬁnition can be seen as belonging to the behaviorist tra-
dition. Caro and Hauser argue that it requires neither mind
reading nor any intentionality on the part of the teacher. On the
basis of this deﬁnition, it is claimed that meerkats (Thornton
and McAuliffe 2006), pied babblers (Raihani and Ridley 2008),
and tandem-running ants (Franks and Richardson 2006) teach.
In contrast, Leadbeater, Raine, and Chittka (2006:R325) argue
that the example of the tandem-running ants should rather be
seen as an example of “telling a fact”—that is, in this example,
where to ﬁnd the food—than as a case of teaching. This alsoThis content downloaded from 146.23
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when they ﬁnd a patch that is abundant in food. Leadbeater,
Raine, and Chittka (2006:R325) propose that the notion of
teaching should be restricted to the transfer of “skills, concepts,
rules and strategies” (Csibra 2007 presents a similar argument).
Furthermore, Byrne and Rapaport (2011) argue that Caro and
Hauser’s criterion is very difﬁcult to apply in many situations
and therefore does not work as an operational criterion.
The deﬁnitions that fall under Kline’s (2015) term “mental-
istic” present teaching as behavior with the intent to enhance
learning in another (Byrne 1995; Moore 2013; Premack and
Premack 1996; Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002; Tomasello, Kruger,
and Ratner 1993). One example is Moore’s (2013:897) deﬁni-
tion: “minimal pedagogy would require only the ability to judge
the incompetence of an action performed in pursuit of a goal,
operating in conjunction with an intention to inform, and the
ability to address a demonstrated behaviour to its intended
audience.” Although such teaching has hardly been observed
in nonhuman animals (Boesch 1991 is an exception), Moore
suggests that chimpanzees may have this ability.
According to Kline’s classiﬁcation, culture-based deﬁnitions
of teaching concern activities in classrooms in modern socie-
ties, in contrast to informal learning in traditional societies
(Lancy 2010; Paradise and Rogoff 2009). From our point of
view, classroom teaching is less interesting, since it is a com-
paratively recent phenomenon and does not give much insight
into the evolutionary roots of teaching.
Note that throughout the text we write about teacher and
learner in the singular, although we fully acknowledge that
teaching forms are embedded in a cultural setting (Sterelny
2012) and that teaching should rather be seen in the context of a
“many-to-many” relationship. The evolution of teaching can
therefore not be separated from the evolution of culture (Fuen-
tes 2015). Teaching can also be both vertical—between gener-
ations—and horizontal—within a generation (d´Errico and
Banks 2015).
The different levels of nonintentional and intentional teach-
ing that we present in “Learning without Intentional Teaching”
and “Levels of Intentional Teaching” depend on different cog-
nitive and communicative capacities. We next prepare the
ground by presenting these prerequisites in some detail.Mind Reading in Teaching Contexts
One form of cognition that is well developed in humans, com-
pared to other species, is mind reading (also called “theory of
mind,” e.g., in Premack and Woodruff 1978; Tomasello 1999),
which in this context means the sharing and representing of
others’mentality.Mind reading is not a unitary ability, however,
but it can apply to understanding the emotions, attention, de-
sires, intentions, and beliefs of others (Gärdenfors 2003, 2007).
Several authors have claimed that teaching is linked to
mind reading (Frye and Ziv 2005; Kruger and Tomasello 1996;
Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002; Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner
1993). In particular, the capacity to understand that somebody2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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relevant fact is central for intentional teaching. When discuss-
ing the intentionality of teaching, it is useful to follow Dennett’s
(1987) classiﬁcation. Zero-order intentionality ascribes no in-
tentionality to an individual (the potential teacher). First-order
intentionality attributes belief and desires to the individual, in
particular a desire to modify the behavior of another individual.
This level, however, presumes no understanding of the mind
of the other. Second-order intentionality requires an individual
to have an understanding of both their own and others’ minds
and a desire to modify the mind of another (not just their be-
havior).
Two cooperative forms of mind reading important for
teaching are joint attention and joint intention (Tomasello
1999; Tomasello et al. 2005). Joint attention results when the
agents have eye contact while sharing attention to a target. The
ability to engage in joint attention has not, so far, been es-
tablished conclusively in nonhuman primates (for a different
view, see Gomez 2007; Leavens, Hopkins, and Bard 2005;
Leavens, Racine, and Hopkins 2009). As we see in “Levels of
Intentional Teaching,” joint attention is necessary for our
levels 2–5 of intentional teaching. Joint intention requires that
the agents share an intention to interact, react to each other’s
intentions to act, and coordinate their intentions (Tomasello
2014; Tomasello et al. 2005). In typical human teaching sit-
uations, the teacher and the learner have the joint intention
that the learner learns a particular technique, skill, fact, or rule:
the teacher intends to show or inform the learner something,
and the learner intends to learn from this interaction. Even
young infants are inclined to interpret the behaviors of others
as intentional (Csibra and Gergely 2007). This prepares the
ground for a human learner to understand the goals of a
teacher.Forms of Communication
Teaching presumes communication between teacher and
learner. As we see in “Levels of Intentional Teaching,” already
our second level, drawing attention, presumes indexicality
(Peirce 1932), in the sense that the teacher can indicate, by
pointing or some othermethod, an object or an action that is in
focus.
When it comes to more advanced communication, it is useful
to distinguish between language and signaling. A decisive dif-
ference between these forms is that signals merely indicate what
is present in the environment (Gärdenfors 2003; Hockett 1960).
However, (iconic) gestures and (symbolic) words make it pos-
sible to communicate about things that are absent and may not
even exist. (Following Peirce 1932, an icon is taken to be a sign
that resembles what it represents, while a symbol is an arbitrary
sign.) Hockett (1960) calls this displaced communication. In this
function, gestures and words retain meaning in the absence of
the referent. Sign languages used by the deaf also have this func-
tion. Nonhuman animals mainly communicate by vocal signals,
although gestures are sometimes used (Tanner and Byrne 1996;This content downloaded from 146.23
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cases a gesture too—is a convention that one must learn if one is
to use it as a communicative tool. Gestures and words have a
“communicative sign function” (Zlatev, Persson, andGärdenfors
2005), which means that the one producing the sign intends it
to stand for something else and that the addressee understands
this intention. Hence, communication by gestures or words
presumes second-order intentionality, according to Dennett’s
(1987) classiﬁcation. Gestures and words can be used to off-load
the demands of mind-reading cognition: a teacher can com-
municate emotions, desires, and intentions, so that the learner
need not rely only on facial or behavioral cues (that have no
communicative sign function). Several researchers have sug-
gested relationships between language evolution and a gradual
development in stone tool production over time (Gibson and
Ingold 1993; Mahaney 2014; Stout 2010; but see Botha 2015).
Learning without Intentional Teaching
A central question when investigating the evolution of teaching
is what skills and what knowledge can be learned by imitation
or emulation and what requires some form of teaching (see
discussions in Morgan et al. 2015; Shipton and Nielsen 2015).
Many human skills, let alone human knowledge systems, are
so complicated that they cannot be learned by imitation or
emulation only. For example, Tehrani and Riede (2008:318)
write about expert weaving and master stone tool making that
“if observation and imitation were the major modes of trans-
mission for these skills, we might expect that, over the course
of many generations, complex craft and toolmaking traditions
would be extremely vulnerable to failings of memory, copying
error and inter-individual differences in natural ability.” In this
section, we focus on social learning in humans and other ani-
mals that may occur without intentional teaching being in-
volved. Our purpose is to position our research on teaching
within the vast research area on social learning (Högberg,
Gärdenfors, and Larsson 2015).Emulation, Imitation, and Rehearsal
In animal social learning, the learning individual observes the
behavior of a second knowledgeable individual (the model),
while the model does not adapt its behavior to make it easier for
the ﬁrst individual to learn. An example is the nut-cracking
behavior of chimpanzees. It can take up to 4 years for adolescent
chimpanzees to learn from adults and become proﬁcient at
cracking open palmnuts with stone hammers and anvils. Adults
rarely help in correcting hammering techniques or encourage
the young (Boesch 1991). Tomasello (1999) distinguishes be-
tween learning by emulation, where the learner observes the
outcomes of the model’s actions and tries to reach the same
outcome (goal oriented), and learning by imitation, where the
learner observes the sequence of the model’s actions and tries to
perform the same actions (process-oriented learning; see also
Tehrani and Riede 2008).2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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Marshall-Pescini (2005) have been designed to investigate the
differences between emulation and imitation. Early results
indicated that chimpanzees emulate while children imitate.
Later studies by Whiten et al. (2009) suggest, however, that
the situation is more complicated: the apes are not conﬁned
to emulation but also imitate extensively. It has been shown,
for example, that the technology of nut cracking among apes
can be transmitted by social learning from one generation to
the next (Fragaszy et al. 2013; Wynn et al. 2011). Zentall
(2004) also presents evidence that imitation can be found in
several bird species.
Apes can be trained to imitate in the so-called do-as-I-do
paradigm. In these experiments, the subject (ape) is shown
actions on objects and is then encouraged to “do the same
thing,” and the spontaneous handling of the object is recorded
(Toth et al. 1993). The results show a notable increase with age
in the ability to manage approximate imitation (Bjorklund and
Bering 2003). However, mother-reared chimpanzees seem to
do less well, while encultured apes can outperform human
children on certain tasks (Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh, and
Kruger 1993). Bjorklund and Bering (2003) suggest that part of
what comprises the enculturation phenomenon is a greater
conceptualization of human behavioral programs. However,
unlike the case with human children, the imitation does not
come spontaneously with the apes but must be extensively
trained.
Children not only imitate but they overimitate, in the sense
that they copy actions performed by the model that are ob-
viously irrelevant for the success of the task (Whiten et al.
2009; Nielsen 2011). One interpretation of this behavior is
that children trust that adults know the right sequence of
actions needed to attain a particular goal. Whiten, Horner,
and Marshall-Pescini (2005:280) suggest the explanation that
“we are such a thorough-going cultural species that it pays
children . . . to copy willy-nilly much of the behavioral rep-
ertoire they see enacted before them” (see also Boyd and
Richerson 2008).
An important difference is that human children, but pre-
sumably not apes, can voluntarily rehearse a particular behavior
(Donald 2012). This is related to Donald’s (1991) “mimesis
hypothesis,” which proposes that while ape culture is based on
associational learning, early Homo evolved a new form of cog-
nition. The basis for this is that the body can be used volitionally
to do what somebody else is doing and to represent external
events for the purpose of communication (mime, gesture).
Donald (2012) expands themimesis hypothesis and emphasizes
that a key feature of the human memory system is our ability to
voluntarily retrieve a particularmemory. The importance of this
capacity in relation to our stone tool technology examples
presented below is that skilled stone knapping requires re-
hearsal. Donald’s insight is that there can be no rehearsal
without voluntary recall of previous performance. The ap-
prenticeship culture that evolved among hominins (Sterelny
2012) presumes a well-established ability to rehearse.This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aEnhancement
We next discuss teaching that satisﬁes Caro and Hauser’s
functional deﬁnition where no intention to teach is ascribed to
the teacher. We separate two forms of nonintentional teaching:
enhancement and evaluative feedback of a learner’s behavior.
(Enhancement is sometimes called “scaffolding.” We avoid that
term, however, since scaffolding often is intentional, at least
among humans.) To a large extent, these forms match what
Caro and Hauser (1992) call “opportunity teaching” and “coach-
ing,” respectively.
A teacher enhances learning by changing the environment
so that the learner learns more quickly than it would otherwise
have done (Caro and Hauser 1992). Caro (1980) showed, in a
laboratory study, that kittens that were exposed to live prey in
the presence of their mother became better hunters than
kittens who were exposed to prey alone. Meerkats bring back
scorpions, often disabled by removal of their sting. As the
meerkat pups grow older, the adults modify their behavior,
giving the pups increasingly intact prey. However, they do not
seem to gauge the skill level of the pup but rely only on changes
in pup begging calls with age (Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton
andMcAuliffe 2006). This indicates that the adults do not have
any understanding of the competence of the pups.Nonintentional Evaluative Feedback
The second form of nonintentional teaching is evaluative
feedback (mainly approval or disapproval) of the learner’s be-
havior (Castro and Toro 2004). Empirical data on this form of
teaching include chimpanzee mothers taking away dangerous
food from infants and gorilla as well as chimpanzee and ma-
caque mothers encouraging infants’ independent locomotion
(Maestripieri 1995, 1996; Whiten 1999). Burton (1992) ob-
served that macaque infants that were encouraged to walk were
later better at jumping, climbing, and leaping than their age-
mates that had not been encouraged. In a study by Humle and
Snowdon (2008), captive cottontop tamarin parents were taught
two different methods of obtaining food. To some extent their
juveniles copied the behavior of their parents, but they also
continued begging for food. Interestingly, when a juvenile had
learned to retrieve the food, the adults refused begs by their
juveniles signiﬁcantly more than before. This is a form of
evaluative feedback that encourages the juvenile to obtain food
for itself. Evaluative feedback can be seen as an extension of
operant conditioning where the teacher provides (part of) the
reinforcement or punishment. It is, however, difﬁcult to verify
that the examples presented here really involve nonintentional
behavior of part of the animal parents (see the next section).
Teaching by evaluative feedback in the form of disapproval is
similar to other kinds of disapprovals of behavior, mainly in the
form of aggression, which occurs in territory defense and
competition for food. This kind of behavior does not quite
satisfy Caro and Hauser’s (1992) deﬁnition, since it involves an
immediate beneﬁt for the aggressor. Nevertheless, the individual2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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contested territory or to avoid competing for food.
Levels of Intentional Teaching
We now turn to our main analysis of levels of teaching. For
all ﬁve levels it is assumed that the teacher has an intention
that the pupil learn something that it would not learn without
the intervention of the teacher.Intentional Evaluative Feedback
Evaluative feedback is ubiquitous in human interactions, but
here their expressions are often intentional, the teacher’s in-
tention simply being that the learner exhibit correct behavior.
Maestripieri (1996:374) suggests that the most parsimonious
interpretation of ape and monkey mothers’ encouragement
behavior is that it is intentional: they want their offspring to
behave in a particularmanner (a ﬁrst-order intention, according
to Dennett’s [1987] classiﬁcation). Even if we agree that apes
and monkey mothers satisfy the criteria of ﬁrst-order inten-
tionality, the evaluative feedback in nonhuman species seems to
be restricted to a limited set of learning situations, while in
humans it can be used in almost all circumstances. These uses of
evaluative feedback exhibit a more advanced form of mind
reading than the nonintentional forms. Furthermore, there is no
indication that the ape or monkey mothers have any under-
standing of how they change the mental states of their learners.
This would be a second-order intention in Dennett’s (1987)
terminology, since the teacher then has an understanding of
both its own and the pupil’s state of knowledge and a desire to
modify the mind of the pupil so that it learns something. On the
other hand, the learner need not employ any form of mind
reading but need only react to the teacher’s signal as a reward or
as a punishment.
Castro and Toro (2004:10237) argue that evaluative feedback
(disapproval) “allows the offspring to acquire information about
behaviors they are self-discovering without having to experience
all their negative consequences.” We do not ﬁnd this proposal
sufﬁcient, since it does not explain why evaluative feedback is so
rare in other species but ubiquitous in humans. Parents in all
human cultures frequently react, positively or negatively, to the
behavior of their offspring. We suggest that the increased ca-
pacity for mind reading is an important part of the explanation.
If a potential teacher does not understand that the learner does
not have the relevant knowledge, there is no incentive to teach.
On our analysis, intentional teaching comprises several ad-
ditional levels, apart from intentional evaluative feedback. We
distinguish between drawing attention, demonstrating, com-
municating concepts, and explaining relationships between
concepts. Each of these levels represent increasing demands on
human intentions, mind reading, and communication, com-
pared to the previous levels. Therefore, we submit that level after
level has been added during the evolution of teaching in the
order we present them here.This content downloaded from 146.23
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The next level of teaching concerns the teacher drawing the
learner’s attention to something that is relevant in the learning
situation. When drawing attention, the teacher’s intention is
that the learner focus on a particular object, action, or feature. If
the learner directs its attention to the intended goal, shared at-
tention is achieved. In order to reach joint attention, the learner
must also see that the teacher attends to the same thing,
something that involves a form of mind reading on the part of
the learner.
Among humans, drawing attention is often achieved by
pointing. Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra (1975) introduced the
distinction between “imperative” and “declarative” pointing.
Imperative pointing is performed in order tomake the attendant
do something for the pointer, for example, a chimpanzee indi-
cating where on its body it wants to be groomed (Pika and
Mitani 2006). Declarative pointing involves directing the at-
tention of the attendant toward a focal object, for example, an
infant pointing to an interesting object to obtain its mother’s
evaluation of the object (Brinck 2004; Tomasello, Carpenter,
and Liszkowski 2007). Pointing is naturally combined with
evaluative feedback, for example, a parent with a fearful ex-
pression on his or her face pointing to a nearby snake. This
combination has been called emotive declarative pointing
(Brinck 2001; Gärdenfors and Warglien 2013), or expressive
declarative pointing (Tomasello, Carpenter, and Liszkowski
2007). The main beneﬁt for the learner of such an exchange is
that he or she can learn about the values of objects vicariously.
Nonhuman animals draw attention, in particular via alarm
calls. However, in most cases these signals seem to be noninten-
tional and not dependent on what the conspeciﬁcs know and do
not know (for an exception among chimpanzees, see Crockford
et al. 2012). However, there exist several cases of drawing atten-
tion among other species that seem to fulﬁll the criteria of ﬁrst-
order intentionality. A common attention-getter in many ani-
mals is to position oneself within the visual ﬁeld of the other.
Apes also try to get somebody’s attention by using nonvocal
sound, that is, clapping hands or banging on a resounding object
(Call and Tomasello 2008).
Apes that are exposed to human behavior can learn to point
imperatively, but pointing is rare in wild populations (Povinelli,
Bering, and Giambrone 2003). Pointing declaratively presumes
the capacity for joint attention. Leavens and Racine (2009) note
that almost all apes that have undergone language training can
point declaratively, although such pointing is not as frequent as
in human infants. They argue that learning to point declara-
tively requires an environment where such acts receive positive
responses, and encultured apes seldom experience such social
contingencies, let alone apes in the wild.Demonstrating
The next level in our hierarchy is demonstrating that involves
intentionality by showing somebody else how to perform a2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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form of teaching, and children begin to demonstrate at an
early age (Strauss, Ziv, and Stein 2002). When demonstrating,
the teacher’s intention is that the learner exhibit the right ac-
tions in the correct sequence. It should be noted that dem-
onstration presumes that the learner will learn by imitation
rather than by emulation. Highlighting initial and ﬁnal states
of an action helps the learner to segment the sequence of ac-
tions as well as the preconditions for the initiation of the ac-
tion and the properties of its ﬁnal result (Rohlﬁng, Fritsch, and
Wrede 2004).
Demonstrating builds on advanced mind reading for both
the teacher and the learner. It presumes that the teacher
understands the lack of knowledge in the learner and that the
learner experiences that there is something to learn. Successful
teaching also requires that the teacher and the learner jointly
attend to the demonstration. When the learner tries to imitate
the demonstrated action, the teacher can also react with eval-
uative feedback and, if necessary, renewed demonstration.
Then the learner rehearses the action sequence until a satis-
factory result is achieved. There are rare observations of
chimpanzees showing somebody else how to perform an ac-
tion: amother can show her infant how to hold a stone in order
to crack a nut against an anvil stone (Boesch 1991). We do not
consider this to be a good example of demonstration, since the
mother only helps the infant to hold the stone correctly but
does not show how to hit the nut. Since the chimps have not
“socialized” their attention, this form of teaching by demon-
stration cannot reach very far.
The features ofmind reading and communication involved in
teaching in the levels presented up to now ﬁt well with Donald’s
(1991) account of what a prelinguistic mimetic culture might
have looked like. Of course, there is no direct evidence for how
the early levels of teaching that have been presented so far have
evolved. Even though we in no way believe that a direct parallel
can be made between the early hominins and extant human
societies, it is still of some interest to compare with teaching in
modern stone-tool-making societies. One example comes from
Stout’s (2010) investigation of Langda stone knappers. He notes
that when an expert is working with an apprentice, common
expressions are: (1) “Do it here” (drawing attention), (2) “Don’t
do that” (evaluative feedback), (3) “Look here” (drawing at-
tention), and (4) “Wait, you have to do this” (demonstration).
These expressions are good illustrations of the levels that we
have presented so far. They are, of course, accompanied by
gestures, facial expressions, and demonstrating actions.Communicating Concepts
During our evolution we have relied on concepts for everyday
problem solving, for example, learning to recognize edible plant
species, distinguishing the tracks of a hyena from those of a
leopard, or recognizing a suitable platform in stone tool pro-
duction. There is a great deal of controversy in the cognitive
sciences concerning how to characterize a concept. For ourThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms apurposes, it is sufﬁcient that having a concept involves the
ability to recognize a pattern (Gärdenfors and Lindström 2008).
Some of these patterns are perceptual and others—for example,
kinship relations—more abstract.
In modern human societies, the main method to teach a
concept is to use a word that represents the concept, together
with pointing or some other technique for drawing attention to
what is denoted by the concept, in particular the pattern as-
sociated with it. Children are well adapted to learning the
meaning of words, and often a single example is sufﬁcient
(Carey 1978). When they learn the words for new kinds of
objects there is a shape bias; that is, the shape pattern of the
object is the most important property in determining cate-
gory membership (Smith and Samuelson 2006).
When communicating a concept, the teacher’s intention is
that the learner perceive a particular pattern that pertains to an
object or an action. For more abstract concepts, the intention is
that the learner mentally represent the relevant patterns. In re-
lation to stone tool production, Wynn and Coolidge (2012:70),
for example, write about the importance of the distal convexity
of a core as a focal point in Levallois technology, “distal core
convexity” being a necessary concept to communicate.
As regards requirements of communication, concept teach-
ing builds on a form more advanced than the previous levels. It
relies on increased mind reading, since it presumes that the
learner understands that the teacher is intentionally using a
gesture or a sound as a communicative sign, that is, that the
gesture or sound is used to “stand for” something else (Zlatev,
Persson, and Gärdenfors 2005). It is not necessary that concepts
be communicated by words. Before speech is available (in
evolution or in development), an iconic gesture can also be used
to convey a concept (an onomatopoetic sound can be seen as a
kind of iconic gesture). For example, when ﬁnding an animal
track, present-day hunter-gatherers mime the animal that made
the track, because speech might cause the prey to ﬂee (Lieben-
berg 1990).
An important type of teaching, based on communicating
concepts, is when a learner is taught subgoals in a technological
hierarchy. The more complex a technology becomes, the more
subgoals are involved (Lombard and Haidle 2012; Mahaney
2014; Moore 2010). Here we deﬁne subgoals as necessary pro-
duction phases that must be completed before the next stage of
production can start. In terms of knapping, Stout (2011), in-
spired by Moore (2010), has discussed this within the frame of
hierarchical cognitive structures of increasing complexity. In
such a hierarchy, the various phases in the production process
are grouped into increasingly nested categories (see ﬁg. 1).
In these action hierarchies, higher levels correspond to more
abstract subgoals, while the lowest level corresponds to motor
acts (“grasp” or “rotate”). The number of levels involved is called
the “planning depth” of the technology. Similar hierarchical
analyses have been proposed by Haidle (2009, 2010) and
Perrault et al. (2013; see also Greenﬁeld 1991, which Moore
2010 builds on). An increased planning depth demands more
developedworkingmemory and executive functions. It has been2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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span has gradually increased (Coolidge and Wynn 2005; No-
well 2010), with an estimated span of 2 5 1 units for chim-
panzees and pre-Homo and 75 2 units for modern humans
(Read and van der Leeuw 2008). Furthermore, Stuart-Fox
(2014) argues that increased working memory is involved in
understanding causal relations (see “Explaining Relationships
between Concepts”).
The main point in relation to teaching is that the subgoals
cannot be perceived directly from the action sequence and are
therefore very difﬁcult, or impossible, to learn via imitation
(sensu Moore 2010). The subgoal features can therefore not be
introduced by drawing attention or demonstration. They must
be taught via concepts. In “Teaching Late Acheulean Hand-
Axe Technology,” we argue that learning the late Acheulean
hand-axe technology is made possible by the teacher, who
assists the learner in understanding the structure of the sub-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms agoals by teaching how to perceive patterns. As you become a
more skilled stone toolmaker, you focus less and less on the
lower-level actions and more on the properties of the subgoals
that you are working on (cf. Greenﬁeld 1991:535). It is, how-
ever, not only the quantity of subgoals involved that deter-
mines complexity. A production process may involve only a
few subgoals, but if one of them is difﬁcult to learn, it will take
in-depth teaching and hard practice over a long period to ac-
quire the knowledge needed.Explaining Relationships between Concepts
Words or gestures can be used to teach concepts, but lin-
guistic communication mainly involves relationships between
concepts. Relations between concepts are, for example, that
mushrooms that look like champignons but have white gills
are poisonous and that wet wood is difﬁcult to use to light aFigure 1. Illustration of subgoal hierarchy in stone knapping. The ﬁgure illustrates the planning depth involved in shaping a late
Acheulean hand-axe. Complete ﬂake detachment relies on several subgoals. If a ﬂake is to be detached, target selection (a), hammer
selection (b), and percussion (c) are performed. Percussion (c) includes how to position the core (d), how to grip the hammer stone
(e), and how to strike (f). If percussion involves platform preparation (g), more subgoals are involved: that is, hammer stone selection
(h), positioning the core (i), and light percussion (j). Again, these subgoals include more subgoals: that is, hammer stone grip (k) and
grasping (l) and rotating (m) the object. Figure reworked from Stout (2011:1052).2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Gärdenfors and Högberg Archaeology of Teaching and Evolution of Homo docens 195ﬁre. The next level of teaching concerns conveying such rela-
tionships. Here we consider teaching causal relationships.
Human reasoning about causal relationships is different
from that of other species, in particular reasoning about causes
that cannot be directly perceived (Penn and Povinelli 2007).
For example, monkeys have difﬁculties interpreting signs in-
dicating that there are predators in the vicinity. Cheney and
Seyfarth (1990) made a false python track in the sand for a ﬂock
of vervet monkeys. They did not react to this, even though
pythons are highly dangerous to vervets. Nor did the monkeys
react when a dead antelope was hung up in a tree, despite the
fact that this was a clear sign that there might be a leopard in
the vicinity.
As regards causal learning, Woodward (2011) distinguishes
between three learner forms: (1) the “egocentric causal learner,”
who is able to learn causal relationships linking its own ac-
tions to outcomes; (2) the “agent causal learner,”who also learns
about causal relationships from the actions of others; and (3) the
“observation causal learner,” who also learns from patterns of
covariation in nature that are not produced by any agent. Toma-
sello and Call (1997) suggest that apes are not observation
causal learners (see also Povinelli 2000). They are egocentric
causal learners, and to some extent, via imitation or emulation,
they become agent causal learners. Children are avid agent
causal learners (see, e.g., Meltzoff 1995). Human infants learn
basic causal connections from their experiences. In particular,
explorative play is helpful here. Children are also observation
causal learners, but only to a limited extent: they fail to perceive
many contingencies, for example, that lack of food leads to a
bad temper. Furthermore, they often think that they see causal
relations where there are none (as do human adults), and they
tend to have animist conceptions of causes in the world.
Experience is not sufﬁcient for learning about the causal
relationships that are required for a successful life, in particular
in an extreme environment. Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich
(2011) present a list of examples from Inuit knowledge about
causal relationships that are necessary for survival in the en-
vironment and are impossible for Inuit children to learn from
personal experience. Here a teacher who presents explanations
about, for example, the connection between the breathing
holes of seals in the ice and their behavior or what causes the
soot from a seal fat lampwill dramatically increase the learning
speed. Another example is the relationship between various
species of plants and their medical effects, which, again, cannot
be learned from experience alone. In general, causal relation-
ships can be seen as a special kind of “patterns”—patterns in
time: if cause C is present, then effect E will follow, where C
and E are concepts.
The teacher’s intention in explaining is that the learner un-
derstand the causal relationship between two concepts. Teach-
ing by explaining also presumes that the learner understands
that the teacher is using gestures or words as a communicative
sign. Furthermore, explaining often involves displacement of
the referents. Teaching facts and causal relationships involves
using combinations of concepts. It is possible that such com-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms abinations can be achieved with iconic gestures, but a symbolic
language would enhance the communication.
Another example of an area for teaching about causal rela-
tionships is tracking (Lombard and Gärdenfors, forthcoming;
Shaw-Williams 2014; Stuart-Fox 2014). Liebenberg (1990) calls
tracking “the origin of science.” As mentioned above, nonhu-
man animals do not understand tracks as effects of an animal
or human causing the tracks (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Shaw-
Williams 2014). In terms of Woodward’s (2011) classiﬁcation,
one has to be at least an agent causal learner to achieve this.
When a learner observes a track, the teacher can explain the
track as the effect of an animal or human passing by and per-
haps add other inferences about the behavior of the individ-
ual. It would be beyond the capacity of a single learner to pick
up all this knowledge from his or her personal experience.
Stuart-Fox (2014) notes that ideas about causal connections
that an individual can form—for example, concerning the
relationship between a track and the animal that caused the
track—are prone to errors. So how can efﬁcient causal cog-
nition evolve? Stuart-Fox argues that in a social species there
are two means of conﬁrming a causal hypothesis. One is the
endorsement of expert others. In our terminology, this amounts
to a version of evaluative feedback, albeit what is approved
represents a relationship between concepts, rather than the be-
havior of the learner. The second means is coherence within a
structure of previously shared beliefs. Shared beliefs develop
through the activities of the group, and coherence of beliefs
reﬂects the experience of the group. In other words, learning
causal beliefs mainly consists of social learning (see also Lieben-
berg 1990).
Table 1 summarizes our discussion concerning different
forms of teaching. The levels are presented in terms of in-
creasing demands on the intention of the teacher, increased
demands on mind reading in the teacher and in the learner,
and increasing demands on the underlying communication
system. It should be noted that the order of the forms of mind
reading ﬁts with the evolutionary (and developmental) order
proposed by Gärdenfors (2007).Archaeological Applications: Teaching Oldowan
and Late Acheulean Technologies
Teaching Oldowan Stone Tool Making
We next turn to our ﬁrst thesis, that for stable cultural trans-
mission learning core maintenance in Oldowan technology
required at least teaching by demonstration. The Oldowan is
generally associated with Homo habilis and early Homo erec-
tus, but other hominin species might have used it as well (Toth
et al. 1993). Oldowan technology is based on ﬂake production
from simple cores. Flakes and, more contingent, cores (Toth
and Schick 1993) were used as tools for butchery and possibly
plant processing (Lemorini et al. 2014; Torre 2011;Wynn et al.
2011) as well as for nonsubsistence tasks such as woodwork-
ing (Lemorini et al. 2014). Oldowan has previously been re-2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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However, a recent study provides evidence that ﬂaked tools
predate Oldowan (Harmand et al. 2015).
The technology is limited to two techniques—knapping
with a hammer stone using direct percussion and bipolar per-
cussionwith an anvil (Braun et al. 2008)—and a few tasks—raw
material acquisition, ﬁnding a suitable hammer stone or anvil,
ﬁnding a place to knap, splitting up a nodule, detaching a ﬂake,
twisting the core to detach anotherﬂake, and repeating this until
the core is exhausted (Stout et al. 2009; Toth and Schick 1993).
Toth and Schick (1993:349) have demonstrated that the abil-
ity to recognize acute angles on cores to serve as striking plat-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aforms and good hand-eye coordination are important princi-
ples necessary to master Oldowan stone tool making. Drawing
on these results, we bring out the principle of core mainte-
nance as an important quality to master. Core maintenance is
achieved by detaching ﬂakes from the core in a way that makes
it possible to strike further ﬂakes from it later (see ﬁg. 2). The
principle is that a ﬂake is detached in a way that allows for a
second ﬂake to be detached. This second ﬂake is then detached
in a way that allows for a third ﬂake to be detached, and so on.
This is repeated until the core is exhausted, that is, until it is
no longer possible to detach ﬂakes. It keeps the core active in a
toolkit without immediately exhausting it and, hence, extendsTable 1. Summary of forms of teachingType of teaching Intention of teacher2.
ndMind reading of learner and teacher125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
 Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicCommunicative requirementsNonintentional teaching:
Enhancement None None None
Nonintentional evaluative feedback None None, but empathy helps Evaluative expressionIntentional teaching:
1. Intentional evaluative feedback Correct behavior None, but empathy helps Evaluative expression
2. Drawing attention Joint attention Joint attention Pointing (or gaze direction)
3. Demonstrating Learn action sequence Joint attention and joint intention Demonstration
4. Communicating concepts Perceive pattern Understand sign function Iconic gesture or spoken word
5. Explaining relationships between
concepts Learn factual or causal relation Understand sign function Displaced communicationFigure 2. Oldowan core maintenance. A, Oldowan core maintenance: ﬂake 1 is detached in a way that allows for ﬂake 2 to be
detached. Flake 2 is detached in a way that allows for ﬂake 3 to be detached, and so on. B, A reﬁtted Oldowan core viewed from the
platform. Several ﬂakes have been detached in a sequence. The numbers 1–5 indicate the ﬁrst ﬁve ﬂakes. The thick black line marks
the platform edge at the core front after these ﬁve ﬂakes were detached (revised from Steele 1999). The core is approximately 15 cm
from left to right.ago.edu/t-and-c).
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et al. 2008). Extensive reﬁtting analyses demonstrate that core
maintenance was practiced in Oldowan stone knapping. De-
lagnes and Roche (2005) have reported on cores fromwhich up
to 20 ﬂakes have been knapped in this way.
For core maintenance to be achieved, the ﬂakes must be
detached from a core with a platform using a correct angle
between platform and core front, a front that allows for the
ﬂake to be detached without fracturing in a way that causes
irregularities on the core front, and a distal core end that allows
ﬂakes to detach without errors. To set up a core that matches
these criteria is, however, not enough to achieve core mainte-
nance. Experimental studies have shown that core mainte-
nance, as described here, requires planning. It is an intentionally
applied strategy and does not automatically or randomly follow
from any type of knapping (Sternke and Sørensen 2009). The
teacher must demonstrate a setup that allows a ﬂake to be de-
tached in a way that facilitates the detachment of another ﬂake,
which in turn facilitates the detachment of the next ﬂake, and so
on. And the learner must practice tomaster this setup. It should
be noted, however, that coremaintenance does not presume any
planning depth, that is, an understanding that the ﬁrst ﬂake in
the sequence will result in the whole coming series of ﬂakes.
Since the technology builds on repetition, one would need only
to have been taught, ﬁrst, how to set up a core and knap a correct
ﬂake one at a time and, second, to understand how the de-
tachment of a ﬂake alters the core and in doing so facilitates the
detachment of another ﬂake.
The way we lay out core maintenance here is similar to how
Moore (2010:18ff.) describes stone knapping built up by single
basic ﬂake units carried out sequentially. However, whileMoore
suggests that this can be achieved as a nonintentional result
from static core morphology—and consequently views it as a
nonintentional part of knapping—we see core morphology as
dynamic and something that is intentionally maintained. As
Harmand et al. (2015) have demonstrated, basic intentional
stone knapping that predates Oldowan technology was per-
formedwithout coremaintenance being developed as part of the
knapping principles. This implies that the geometrical rela-
tionships underpinning the basic ﬂake unit can be understood
and practiced without the knapping resulting in core mainte-
nance, something we also see in later prehistoric stone knapping
from different parts of the world (e.g., Högberg 2009; Knarr-
ström 2001; Nishiaki 2000; Rosen 1997). Consequently, we see
core maintenance as an intentional strategy that must be dem-
onstrated for stable cultural transmission.
We conclude that transmitting Oldowan technology requires
imitation, including rehearsal, together with active teaching in
the form of evaluative feedback, drawing attention, and, most
importantly, demonstration. Through imitation and evaluative
feedback, the learner can learn to choose a suitable rawmaterial
or hammer stone. The teacher will scaffold the learning by en-
hancing an appropriate knapping place. Core maintenance re-
quires the teacher to draw attention to a suitable striking plat-
form area on the core. Drawing attention and demonstratingThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms afacilitate the learning of an appropriate way to hold the core and
the correct movement of the arm and hand holding a hammer
stone when detaching a ﬂake. The upshot is that Oldowan tech-
nology could not be transmitted between generations without
intentional teaching, involving drawing attention and demon-
stration.
It should be noted that when we claim that demonstration
is necessary for transmitting the Oldowan technology, we do
not exclude that single skilled individuals could discover the
practice of core maintenance by themselves. In fact, some-
body must have made such a discovery before the technology
could be taught. Our claim is rather that demonstration is
needed for transmitting the technology to other individuals,
without which it is not possible to reliably maintain the tech-
nology within a culture. (Henrich [2004] argues that, apart from
teaching capacity, another factor involved in transmission suc-
cess is population size.)
Some researchers have claimed that the behavior of Oldo-
wan tool-producing hominins can be accommodated within the
ape adaptive grade (Wynn et al. 2011). Wynn et al. (2011:195)
write, “Apes had been very successful and very varied for
millions of years before the advent of ﬂaked stone technology,
and it is likely that several were tool users. It is within this
context that the Oldowan should be understood.” Their main
supporting evidence for the claim is the knapping behavior of
the bonobos Kanzi and Panbanisha, both trained to knap by
human knappers.
However, Toth et al. (1993) show that Kanzi did not achieve
the skill level of Oldowan knappers. Acknowledging differences
in anatomy and motor control (Key and Dunmore 2015;
Williams, Gordon, and Richmond 2014), we submit that there
is a more fundamental difference between the apes and the
hominins. The bonobos never voluntarily rehearsed knapping
as it had been demonstrated to them. Donald’s (2012) thesis
concerning the apes’ lack of voluntary retrieval of memories
entails that they cannot rehearse. Kanzi engaged in the kind of
knapping demonstrated to him only when encouraged by his
teachers or when the reward box was loaded. When knapping
alone, he invented his own techniques; for example, he preferred
throwing the core on the cement ﬂoor, rather than knapping, to
create sharp ﬂakes (Toth et al. 1993). Hence, Kanzi emulated the
human knapper. He did not rehearse the teacher’s actions by
repeating the demonstrations that were provided. In particular,
no signs of core maintenance are visible in Kanzi’s knapping.
There is also a fundamental difference between Oldowan
and ape stone tool use in relation to the intentions involved.
Apes’ use of their stone toolkit gives an immediate food reward:
a nut to eat. In Oldowan knapping, a hammer stone is used to
hit a core to produce a tool that might be kept and transported
for later use (Braun et al. 2008). This is a case of planning for
future goals (Gärdenfors and Osvath 2010; Osvath and Gär-
denfors 2005), also called prospective planning or mental time
travel (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007).
The evolution of autocuing, in the sense of Donald (2012), is
presumably a gradual process, but already for Oldowan tools,2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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(Nonaka, Bril, and Rein 2010). Kanzi is conditioned to knap,
yet he does not exhibit any signs of autocued memories. Such
memories postulate a skill system embedded in a social net-
work of toolmaking practices in which adaptation for learning
to reﬁne skill has evolved (Donald 2012:280). Therefore, we
disagree with Wynn et al. (2011) and view Oldowan technol-
ogy as being beyond the reach of extant apes but presumably
within the reach of extinct hominin species other than Homo
(see Hecht et al. 2015 for a similar conclusion).
It has been suggested that early hominins discovered the
mechanisms of stone ﬂaking as a result of ﬂakes that uninten-
tionally fractured from anvils used for nut or bone cracking
(Marchant and McGrew 2005). How this unintentional ﬂaking
was transformed into basic intentional tool production, as
reported by Harmand et al. (2015), and more elaborate tool
production with accompanied teaching is not known. In a large-
scale experimental study, Morgan et al. (2015) tested how dif-
ferent social-learning mechanisms could be used to transmit
Oldowan stone-knapping techniques. They conclude that cul-
tural reliance onOldowan tools generated a selectionmechanism
that favored teaching (Morgan et al. 2015:3). The levels of in-
tentional teaching we have relied on here—drawing attention
and demonstrating—and their interaction with autocued mem-
ory increase our understanding of how this system might have
worked.Teaching Late Acheulean Hand-Axe Technology
We now turn to our second thesis, that learning late Acheulean
hand-axe technology requires communicating concepts. Hand-
axes are found in Africa, Asia, and Europe and are associated
with H. erectus, Homo heidelbergensis, and late Middle Pa-
leolithic classic Neanderthals (Hodgson 2015; Li et al. 2014;
Lycett and Gowlett 2008; Ruebens 2013; Shipton 2013). In
terms of morphology (an oval bifacial shape), hand-axes show
extraordinary stability over time, even if variation in symmetry
is reported (Cole 2015). At the same time, one ﬁnds distinct
reﬁnement through the long time span of the Acheulean; late
hand-axes are generally thinner and more elaborately knapped
than earlier ones (Diez-Martín et al. 2015; Shipton 2013; Stout
et al. 2009). A comparison made over large geographical areas
indicates noteworthy differences (Davidson and Noble 1993; Li
et al. 2014), in particular between late Acheulean hand-axes
from Europe (Stout et al. 2014), eastern Asia (Li et al. 2014),
and Africa (Beyene et al. 2013). Our discussion here mainly
concerns European examples (Stout et al. 2014).
Late Acheulean hand-axe technology requires advanced
levels of intragenerational transmission of skills and knowledge
(Shipton 2013). Beyond basic tasks such as accessing proper
raw material and being accustomed to a range of working tools
and positions, the production process builds on entangled
sequences of techniques and methods that, in part, repose on
knowledge of speciﬁc concepts. These concepts cannot be
learned by attempts to copy the sequences of techniques andThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms amethods used (Mahaney 2014) or solely by individual (trial-
and-error) learning (Lycett et al. 2015).
A number of theoretical models have been suggested for the
cognitive capacities necessary to perform this technology,
typically dealing with variation and complexity of techniques
and methods involved (Rugg 2011) or with aspects of sym-
metry and the ability to cognitively visualize and process a
three-dimensional image (Lycett et al. 2015; also see Hodgson
2015 for a recent review). We recognize the importance of
these models and expand on them by focusing on the tech-
niques and methods necessary to perform platform prepara-
tion in particularly crucial phases of the production process
(for other relevant concepts, see Read and van der Leeuw
2008). This means that we go beyond analysis of morphology
and symmetry (Cole 2015; Lycett et al. 2015) to discuss a
speciﬁc technological high-level subgoal (see “Communicating
Concepts”; ﬁg. 1).
Platform preparation is systematic ﬂaking (beveling) and
abrading (grinding, rubbing, shearing) applied to the tool with
the intention to shape the platform and alter the platform
angle to support “on-edge” marginal percussion (Mahaney
2014). It is the key technological innovation necessary to
produce the thinner late Acheulean hand-axes (Stout et al.
2014). The concept of a platform is central for the subgoal
structure of the technology (ﬁg. 3). However, as a high-level
subgoal in action hierarchies, platform preparation is difﬁcult
to perceive without having this concept (Stout et al. 2014).
It must be explained to the learner how platform prepara-
tion isolates and alters the platform angle on the area from
which a ﬂake is to be detached. The learner must therefore be
able to envisage the pattern that constitutes an appropriate
platform before it exists. When the importance of the angle is
understood by the learner, this must be supplemented with
showing how to prepare the platform to get it right and how to
apply force to the piece in relation to the angle, so that the
intended type of ﬂake can be detached. The teacher must also
be able to explain why the learner needs to detach that par-
ticular kind of ﬂake (a so-called thinning ﬂake), enabled by
platform preparation. This requires that the teacher be able to
break down the sequences into low- and high-level subgoals
and to highlight these in order to convey the speciﬁc concepts
the learner needs to master the technology. To achieve this, the
idea of how to make the artifact has to be deconstructed
(Gowlett 2011). Then the teacher must help the learner to put
the production process together again, so that it may be in-
ternalized as his/her own knowledge. The teachermust adopt a
holistic view of the complete production process and be able to
teach the process in such a way (Malafouris 2010). This in-
cludes explaining the concept of a platform as well as the
temporal patterns involved in the action hierarchies necessary
to prepare it. And, since the production process is a multi-
variate construct (Gowlett 2011), different phases in the tool
production require different approaches to set up a platform.
Technological variation requires teaching how the production
process is materialized in a variety of opportunities and con-2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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of raw material used and the knapper’s ability to meet these
opportunities and constraints.
To demonstrate the importance of understanding the con-
cept of a platform, we here expand on results presented by
Putt, Woods, and Franciscus (2014). In an experimental study,
they show that the overall shape of a bifacial stone tool and
the concept of symmetry during stone tool reduction can be
learned by both verbal and nonverbal teaching. In the exper-
iment, two groups of novices were instructed to produce a
rough bifacial tool resembling an early Acheulean hand-axe.
One group was instructed by demonstration and verbal in-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms astruction and the other by demonstration only (also see Toth
and Schick 1993:357).
The verbally instructed group tried to copy the teacher’s
actions. Since they had been verbally instructed about the im-
portance of platform preparation, they devoted time to setting
up striking platforms. This indicates that they had perceived the
temporal patterns, subgoals, and hierarchies in the technology.
During this group’s early stage of learning, however, setting up
platformswas difﬁcult. Lacking sufﬁcient practice, theywere not
able to fully convert their knowledge into successful knapping.
The nonverbal group did not understand the concept of a
platform. Therefore, this group aimed to make their productFigure 3. Late Acheulean platform preparation, techniques, and production sequence. A, A prepared platform on a ﬂake from
Boxgrove. The platform is prepared by detaching small ﬂakes at the edge of the tool preform. The negative scars of these ﬂakes can be
seen on the platform in the photo (revised from Stout et al. 2014). B, An imaginary thinning ﬂake has been drawn onto a hand-axe
from Boxgrove (to the left), and on the opposite side of the hand-axe the placement of the platform of that thinning ﬂake is drawn (to
the right). It is on this side that platform preparation has to be applied (photo revised from Stout et al. 2014). C, Using on-edge
percussion allows the knapper to reduce thickness while simultaneously keeping the length and width of the tool, resulting in a tool
with a lenticular cross section. This makes it possible to produce a late Acheulean hand-axe with substantially less body and weight
and a more regular and coherent working edge than early Acheulean hand-axes. With off-edge percussion, the thickness is not
reduced in the same way, and the length and width of the tool change signiﬁcantly throughout the production sequence, resulting in a
diamond-shaped cross section. Arrows mark where the hammer hits the edge. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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200 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 2, April 2017resemble those produced by the teacher. Hence, rather than
trying to conceptualize the particular subgoals that pertained to
the sequences of the actions the teacher performed, this group
showed evidence of emulation.
The variation in teaching inﬂuenced the learning of the two
groups. The nonverbally instructed group did not fully un-
derstand the necessary planning hierarchy involved in the
technology. The verbally instructed group, however, under-
stood the concept of a platform and its relevance to the tech-
nology. They could implement it, at least partially, in their
knapping strategies.
These results are important for understanding the teaching
that is necessary to produce a late Acheulean hand-axe. By
gaining experience through practice, the verbally instructed
group will improve their skills, relying on their knowledge of
the high-level subgoal of platform preparation. Further in-
structed, they will be able to transform the rough bifacial tool
they were taught to produce into a more elaborate shape. In
contrast, the nonverbal group will have a hard time improving
their knapping skills, since they do not sufﬁciently under-
stand the relevant concepts. The conclusion is that to teach
late Acheulean hand-axe production, the teacher must com-
municate displaced concepts (Hockett 1960). In contrast, the
previous levels of intentional teaching we have presented re-
quire only teaching based on communication about perceivable
entities. In support of our statement that the Acheulean tech-
nology is cognitively more demanding than the Oldowan, an
experimental study by Stout et al. (2015) shows that late Acheu-
lean toolmaking affects neural activity and functional connec-
tivity in the dorsal prefrontal cortex to a signiﬁcantly higher de-
gree than Oldowan toolmaking.
It has been suggested that late Acheulean hand-axes acquired
their shape “as luck would have it,” through the sequencing of
core reduction. On the basis of a critical discussion of shape
variability, Dibble (1989) speculates that the regular shape of
Acheulean hand-axes may be a result of technological con-
straints as well as archaeological methods of classiﬁcation, hence
having “nothing to do with mental templates of the hominids
who made them” (Dibble 1989:424). In his study of “grammars
of action,” Moore (2010) also argues that complicated knapping
sequences can be performed by applying simple ﬂake units in
long chains of actions, referred to as “mindless ﬂaking” (Moore
2010:34). In contrast to this, we view platform preparation as a
high-level subgoal in action hierarchies. This goes beyond a
discussion of shape as presented by Dibble (1989). Platform
preparation is close to Moore´s (2010) elaborate ﬂake units but
differs in one signiﬁcantway.WhileMoore (2010) sees stone tool
production as a result of mechanically adding actions together,
we claim that this is not sufﬁcient, since it does not account for
the subgoal structure that must be followed in the production.
Platformpreparation is present in the lateAcheulean ﬁndings
from Boxgrove (Stout et al. 2014), dated to about 500,000 years
ago, associated with H. heidelbergensis. In an analysis of Late
Middle Paleolithic hand-axes, Ruebens (2013) has presented
specimens from about 100,000 years ago associated with classicThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aNeanderthals, knapped in a way that indicates the use of plat-
form preparation. One of the earliest ﬁndings of elaborately
knapped Acheulean hand-axes comes from the Konso Forma-
tion in Ethiopia. These are dated to about 850,000 years ago, are
associated withH. erectus (Beyene et al. 2013), and are knapped
in a way that indicates the use of platform preparation. How-
ever, no technological study of the hand-axes described by
Ruebens (2013) and Beyene et al. (2013) has yet been per-
formed. If our analysis is correct, teaching by communicating
concepts, via words or gestures, was practiced in periods that
predate Homo sapiens. This does not entail that a full linguistic
capacity was in place, but at least that the late Acheulean or late
Middle Paleolithic toolmaker could refer to nonpresent entities.
Conclusion
The evolution of Homo docens can be discussed as something
that emerges gradually, as a behavioral development shaped
through the interaction between nature and nurture (Donald
2001; Högberg and Larsson 2011; Lombard 2012; Zilhão 2007).
Sterelny (2012:8) describes this as “positive feedback loops”
between social complexity and individual cognitive capacity. In
line with Sterelny (2012:xii), our starting point is that human
evolution must be thought of as multifactorial, that a diverse set
of coevolutionary factors over a long time has resulted in the
evolved H. docens, as we see ourselves today (Langbroek 2012).
Here we have investigated one factor—teaching.
The key theoretical contribution of this article is the analysis
of a number of levels of intentional teaching and their cogni-
tive and communicative requirements, as summarized in table 1.
By breaking down teaching into several levels and discussing
them in the context of selected archaeological ﬁnds, we have
been able to demonstrate how different technologies depend
on increasing sophistication in the levels of cognition and com-
munication required for teaching them.
Our analysis also has implications for the evolution of lan-
guage. Evaluative feedback can be given without any iconic or
symbolic communication systems. Attention drawing and dem-
onstration rely on the use of intentional gestures but not
on iconic or symbolic communication. Transmitting concepts,
however, requires detached communication, at least by iconic
means, but a symbolic system would be more efﬁcient. If our
analysis of the late Acheulean technology is correct, it follows
that detached communication was in place among the homi-
nins at least 500,000 years ago. Similarly, explaining relations
between concepts requires detached communication, and here
a symbolic system would be even more efﬁcient.
The general effect of teaching is that it speeds up and im-
proves individual learning. Following the levels we have pre-
sented, Homo sapiens exhibits more advanced forms of teach-
ing than other species. The ordering of the levels of mind
reading corresponding to different levels of teaching presented
here ﬁts well with the evolutionary ordering proposed in
Gärdenfors (2007) and with developmental progress in human
children. Nonhuman species, to varying degrees, display evi-2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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Gärdenfors and Högberg Archaeology of Teaching and Evolution of Homo docens 201dence of copying (emulation and imitation), enhancement,
and evaluative feedback, and a few primate species may exhibit
intentional evaluative feedback. The evidence for teaching by
drawing attention or demonstration is, in nonhuman animals,
so far meager.
In contrast, the hominin line shows, already at 2.6 Mya,
clear signs of intentional teaching. Our ﬁrst empirical thesis
has been that teaching by demonstration (level 3) is necessary
to maintain core-maintenance Oldowan technology. The
second thesis is that late Acheulean hand-axe technology
requires communication of concepts (level 4), for example,
the concept of a platform on a tool preform as part of a high-
level subgoal hierarchy in the production sequence. Teaching,
as we have discussed it here, allows for stable transmission of
technology between generations. If teaching by demonstra-
tion or communication of concepts is accepted as a criterion
for intentional teaching, it follows from our analyses that H.
docens clearly preceded H. sapiens.Acknowledgments
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Is There an Evolutionary Hierarchy
of Intentional Pedagogy?
The authors have performed a valuable service in providing
this comprehensive review, and I am in agreement with muchThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aof what they say. My brief comments concern their objective
of developing an evolutionary hierarchy of teaching, in which
each successive level of mastery represents a hypothetical
evolutionary step in the direction of fully modern Homo
docens.
Their core hypothesis is that primates do not have “inten-
tional” pedagogy, whereas humans do, and that this capacity
ﬁrst emerged in archaic human ancestors long before the evo-
lution of Homo sapiens. This seems a solid conclusion; primates
do not teach one another by accommodating their actions to
the learner, whereas humans actively inﬂuence one another and
rely heavily on a sophisticated pedagogical environment that
guides learning at every opportunity. Sometimes this depen-
dency is greater than we might expect; recent evidence reviewed
by the authors suggests a counterintuitive conclusion: that
highly educated, anatomically modern humans cannot learn to
make Oldowan tools without deliberate and signiﬁcant peda-
gogical guidance. Primates are not able to achieve this level of
teaching at all, but evidently Australopithecus afarensis was al-
ready able to do it severalmillion years ago;Oldowan stone tools
were used in butchering game as early as 3.4 Mya (McPherron
et al. 2010). So we, along with our ancestral species, have been
teachers for quite a while.
One of the authors’ key assertions is that teaching evolved
in several stages, or “levels,” before the emergence of language
and that the more advanced skills needed for Acheulean tool
manufacture indicated the presence of an even higher level of
pedagogical skill in Homo erectus than earlier hominins had
mastered in transmitting Oldowan toolmaking skills. The
reason for this conclusion is that teaching how to make the
more complex Acheulean tools entailed not only a capacity
for demonstrating a speciﬁc set of steps but also the effective
communication of abstract concepts—in the case of making
handaxes, the concept of preparing a core.
However, in my view this assertion is not entirely con-
vincing. The teaching of Acheulean toolmaking may in fact
require a higher pedagogical capacity than the lower one
supposedly needed for teaching Oldowan skills, but it might
also simply reﬂect a bit more of the same, in both teacher and
learner, rather than a qualitatively new stage of pedagogy. A
general improvement in key executive functions such as
working memory, multifocal attention, and temporal inte-
gration might sufﬁce, and the authors acknowledge this pos-
sibility. They also concede that language would probably not
be necessary to communicate a concept such as preparing a
core, but in that case the necessity of their second stage is left
somewhat unresolved.
It is also questionable whether teaching how to prepare a
core can properly be called a “concept” in the sense normally
used in cognitive psychology. Preparing a core is a complex
motor schema, no doubt. But is preparing a core any more
abstract as a motor schema than, for example, the complex
sequence of operations Byrne and Russon (1998) observed in
gorillas as they were learning how to safely eat nettles? The
gorillas learned this complex pattern by what Byrne and2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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paring a core is a tangible intermediary goal in a complex se-
quence of actions that are not telegraphed either by the raw
material (stone) or by the shape of the ﬁnal product, such a
sequence does not appear to be qualitatively different from the
program-level sequences demonstrated in gorillas. In the latter
case, since active pedagogy was virtually absent, the onus was
more on the learner than on the teacher-demonstrator.
This is the nub of the shift from the traditional emphasis on
the learner to the more recent emphasis on the teacher: the
responsibility for learning is now shifted, perhaps too much, to
the teaching environment and away from the learning process.
There is a danger inherent in this shift of emphasis, the same
danger inherent in learning research but in the opposite direc-
tion: that the other element in the teaching-learning dyad is
deemphasized too much. It also raises a real possibility that the
learners in these experimental demonstrations of stone tool-
making, who are usually a highly educated group, have been
trained out of the habit of observational learning and have de-
veloped a stronger habit of depending too much on explicit
instruction. Perhaps subjects can learn not to learn in certain
ways, and, unless liberated from their pedagogical expectations,
they are locked into a teaching paradigm. Until this possibility is
tested, we cannot be sure that Acheulean toolmaking skill really
demands such a qualitative improvement in teaching methods.
This reservation reﬂects a key challenge facing any evolu-
tionary theory that tries to ﬁll in the ﬁner gradations of human
cognitive evolution. We do not have enough information on in-
tervening species to make such ﬁne distinctions, and archaeol-
ogy alone will never provide the kind of detail we would need
to thoroughly test such proposals. We can establish mimesis as
one very basic level of representation that must have existed
very far back in time; and spoken language, clearly on another
level, seems identiﬁed with the much later evolution of sapient
humans. But the ﬁner shades of the transitions between the ﬁrst
and second stages are still very hard to establish with any cer-
tainty. Perhaps at some point paleogenetics will provide us with
better tools.
One closing point: modern humans are speakers, used to
settling communicative issues verbally as well as mimetically.
The authors do not claim thatH. erectus had language, but then
what does their proposal for a higher “communication of
concepts” level amount to? Is it a loose combination of dem-
onstrations, pointing, eye contact, and approving/disapproving
grunts, all driven by the teacher’s grasp of the student’s growing
mastery? Seen from the teacher’s standpoint, that is primarily a
signiﬁcant challenge in evaluating the student’s performance
and in mind reading, but it does not seem very different from
the ﬁrst level in terms of the activity of teaching, except that
the sequence being learned is a bit more removed from the
properties inherent in the raw material and requires ﬁner guid-
ance of attention and possibly a more effective grasp of the
student’s working memory capacity.
Or are they implicitly postulating that some form of lan-
guage must have existed at this early date? I have suggestedThis content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a(Donald 1993) that H. erectus might have had the lexical
equivalent of home signs—protowords—essentially still a
mimetic skill but far short of narrative, which relies on being
able to tell an original story based on personal experience.
However, the presence of home signs or protowords alone
would not justify postulating a qualitatively new stage, in my
opinion.
A ﬁnal point: did pedagogy evolve directly in its own right,
or did it come as part of a more general expansion of hominin
cognitive skill? The authors conclude that the latter may well
have been the case, and I heartily agree with that conclusion.
The major cognitive innovation of humanity is our capacity for
group learning and remembering, and pedagogy is an essential
factor in guiding young learners into the labyrinthine com-
plexities of human cultural networks.Miriam Noël Haidle
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How Teaching Performance Develops
Gärdenfors and Högberg depict in a comprehensive way a
plausible course of the evolution of teaching. In my comment,
I draw attention to the developmental process of this charac-
teristic human phenomenon.
Teaching is an intersubjective performance that comprises
physical, mental, and behavioral aspects of two subjects, A and
B, within a shared environmental or resource space (ﬁg. 4C).
While individual learning of subject A can take place in a non-
social context (ﬁg. 4A), simple forms of social learning by stim-
ulus enhancement, nonintentional evaluative feedback, emu-
lation, and probably simple imitation require a unidirectional
social setting (ﬁg. 4B), with learner A including the perfor-
mance of model B into his/her learning environment. The
different forms of teaching sensu stricto, however, require a
mutual social situation (ﬁg. 4C). In the ideal form, the naïve
individual A perceives the expert individual B as a resource as
well as a target of information; the expert delivers information
about the new performance to be learned but also receives
information about the needs of the naïve learner. The inter-
subjective performance of learning with teaching is a process
that both subjects A and B have to train for individually, but
they do so with the mutual assistance of teaching: the per-
formance is self-enhancing.2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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tention. In humans, joint attention is trained permanently
from the beginning of individual life, by visual eye contact, by
audiovocal interactions, and later including objects by give-
and-take play and in combination with visual and audiovocal
exchanges. The ﬁrst directed initiative generally comes from
older individuals, raising the attention of the newborn. Un-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms adirected gestural, mimic, or vocal utterances of the baby are
answered; after some time the baby starts more or less di-
rected utterances to provoke an answer. The greater the re-
sponse that is provided, the more the baby will take social
initiative. From very early on in life, human babies learn to
refer to other individuals and include objects or other ele-
ments of the environment into the context of social exchange.Figure 4. Different learning situations: nonsocial performance (A); unidirectional social performance (B), and mutual social per-
formance (C).2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
204 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 2, April 2017Advanced forms of imitation in human children, as in apes,
probably do not come spontaneously but are a learned result
of mutual repetition of behavior, which is also a training for
the human ability to rehearse.
The intersubjective performance of learning with teaching
comprehends different subperformances of the naïve and the
experienced individual, including observation, reference to an-
other individual’s performance, and repetition. Natural peda-
gogy (Csibra and Gergely 2011) and theory of mind (Frith
and Frith 2005) are undoubtedly beneﬁcial to the teaching
performance. Yet they are probably not prerequisites of the
developmental process but rather outcomes. The teaching per-
formance—that is, the subperformances—possesses three di-
mensions of development (see Haidle et al. 2015). In the
evolutionary-biological dimension (A), the general anatomical
and physiological range for physical, mental, and behavioral as-
pects of a certain performance has been formed by gene repli-
cation, mutation, natural and sexual selection, and genetic drift,
among other aspects. Regarding the intersubjective perfor-
mance of learning with teaching, humans developed in this di-
mension into curious and socially tolerant beings with many
qualities fostering performances of material and social engage-
ment. Through the ontogenetic-individual dimension (B) of de-
velopment, the general range of the different physical, mental,
and behavioral aspects of a performance are shaped individu-
ally by positive or negative experience. In individual lifeways,
the subjects learn to cope with their environment, avoid harm-
ful settings, or seek beneﬁcial situations. They gain individual
sets of experiences in encounters with elements of the speciﬁc re-
source space and with conspeciﬁcs, as well as other agents and
objects.
If we consider the teaching performance, individuals expe-
rience, for example, joint attention initiated by one or several
models with different frequency, intensity, and feedback of
their own initiative. Some situations will be rewarding in
physical, emotional/mental, or behavioral ways; others may
cause distress. The individuals train their relationships and
individual ways of interactions in this special form of en-
counter with conspeciﬁcs. The historical-social dimension (C)
determines the way in which performances are focused; it
marks the cultural range of a performance set in the historical-
social context. The historical-social dimension narrows the
range of variability given by the evolutionary-biological di-
mension but may broaden an individual’s potential by relying
on the additional experiences of other individuals within a
speciﬁc time and group framework. Important for the teaching
performance is, for example, the group-speciﬁc way of han-
dling babies and young children. This provides the setting for
early experiences of joint attention, or preferred forms of in-
teraction, such as classroom and ex cathedra teaching.
The evolutionary-biological dimension (A) forms the basis
of the ontogenetic-individual dimension (B) and the historical-
social dimension (C), but the speciﬁcations of B and C within
a group contribute to shaping the selective environment of fur-
ther development in A. Thus, the foundations of forms of so-This content downloaded from 146.23
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms acial engagement, such as joint attention, lie in the evolutionary-
biological dimension, but their application creates an envi-
ronment that fosters adaptations toward natural pedagogy and
mind reading. Parallel to material engagement (Malafouris
2013), which shapes the physical, mental, behavioral, and envi-
ronmental aspects of our exposure to the nonsocial world, so-
cial engagement is a catalyst and driving factor of the evolution
of human social performances, with reference to Homo docens
as delineated by Gärdenfors and Högberg. A characteristic of
the development of human teaching is the combination of ma-
terial and social engagement with active teaching as a new re-
lationship to conspeciﬁcs. This broadens the learning environ-
ment and focuses the path of experiences.Reply
We thank Merlin Donald and Miriam Haidle for their con-
structive comments. Donald questions our interpretation of
the teaching involved in late Acheulean toolmaking. He asks
whether platform preparation (Donald calls this “core prepa-
ration”) is more abstract as a motor schema than the “program-
level” imitations performed by gorillas in their preparation of
plant food. Following Byrne and Russon’s (1998) interpretation
of the gorillas’ behavior, he argues that if gorillas can learn
such food-collecting schemas by imitation, then late Acheulean
toolmaking can also be learned by imitation and our conclu-
sion would be invalid.
Donald’s challenge is interesting and worthy of a detailed
analysis. Byrne and Russon’s interpretation has been questioned
by several commentators. Bauer (1998) points out that the food-
preparing techniques show little variation and pass through a
few bottlenecks: collecting whorl of leaves, collecting whorl of
stemless leaves, folding nettle parcel, and putting the parcel into
mouth. This sequence of intermediate states is the only one that
gives a satisfactory result, and it can be learned by priming,
without invoking imitation (Bauer 1998).
But even if the gorillas do not imitate at the program level,
the question whether late Acheulean platform preparation
could be learned by imitation remains. First of all, someone
must have discovered how to do it. For this to happen, no
direct teaching but experimentation was involved. The im-
portant question, however, is how the technology can be
maintained in a culture over several generations without
substantial drift. In our paper, we report on the experiment by
Putt, Woods, and Franciscus (2014), where two groups of
novice knappers were instructed to produce a tool resembling
an Acheulean hand-axe, one group by demonstration, the
other by demonstration and verbal instruction. The result was
that those instructed by demonstration alone tried to make
hand-axes that were as similar as possible to the models, but
they never understood the concept of a platform nor its im-
portance in the process as a high-level subgoal. Those in-2.125.015 on July 25, 2018 05:38:41 AM
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Gärdenfors and Högberg Archaeology of Teaching and Evolution of Homo docens 205structed by demonstration and verbal explanations learned the
concept of a platform and tried to perform accurate platform
preparation as a subgoal in their knapping. Platform prepa-
ration is, however, difﬁcult to master, and since the practice
time was limited, the end results were not better than those of
the other group. Our conclusion is that the group that has been
taught the concept of a platform has a higher potential for
developing their expertise in the late Acheulean hand-axe
production and that imitation alone is not sufﬁcient to learn
platform preparation. An important factor from an evolu-
tionary point of view is also that learning becomes more efﬁ-
cient when the learners are taught the relevant concepts.
We ﬁnd Haidle’s distinctions between nonsocial, unidirec-
tional social, and mutual social learning situations helpful. Her
claim that successful learning depends on establishing rich so-
cial relations between teacher and learner is an important ad-
dition to our analysis. Donald asks whether pedagogy evolved
directly or is part of a more general expansion of human skills.
In our paper, the focus is on the role of the teacher and the
teacher’s intentions, but we agree that the interactive dynamics
between the teacher and the learner is also central and should be
further investigated.
We agree entirely with Haidle’s emphasis on the centrality of
theory of mind in mutual social learning. In particular, she
correctly points out that achieving joint attention is a prereq-
uisite for the mutual social situation. In addition to joint at-
tention, Csibra and Gergely (2009:149) argue that “human
communication is often preceded, or accompanied, by ostensive
signals that (i) disambiguate that the subsequent action (for
example, a tool-use demonstration) is intended to be commu-
nicative and (ii) specify the addressee to whom the communi-
cation is addressed.” Gergely, Egyed, and Király (2007) provide
experimental evidence for the importance of the ostensive na-
ture of the teacher’s behavior. In brief, extensions of mind-
reading capacities are crucial for the evolution of pedagogy.
Donald also asks what is involved in the communication of
concepts. We emphasize that communicating concepts is fun-
damentallymaking the learner see relevant patterns, for example,
the shape of a platform in knapping. Also, learning categori-
zations of plants or spoors of animals involves recognizing new
patterns. Symbolic language need not be involved in this process,
but forms of gesturing are often sufﬁcient. One point we did not
make in the article is that the teacher can check that the learner
has grasped the relevant patterns if the learner exhibits the right
categorizations when faced with practical problems. As Haidle
points out, this feedback to the teacher is an important element
of a teaching culture.
—Peter Gärdenfors and Anders HögbergReferences Cited
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